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This study examined 4- to 5-year-old English-speaking children’s inter-
pretations of sentences containing negation, the universal quantifier, and 
disjunction. Disjunction is assigned two different meanings in such 
sentences depending on its position in surface syntax: in the subject phrase 
of ‘not every’ (e.g., not every passenger who ordered chicken or beef became ill), a 
disjunctive meaning is assigned to disjunction (e.g. at least one passenger 
who ordered chicken OR at least one passenger who ordered beef became 
ill); in the predicate phrase of ‘not every’ (e.g., not every passenger who became 
ill ordered chicken or beef), a conjunctive meaning is assigned (e.g., at least one 
passenger who became ill did not order chicken AND did not order beef). If 
children bring knowledge of combinatory logical principles to the task of 
language acquisition, then they should be sensitive to this asymmetry. We 
tested this prediction using a truth-value judgment task.  
 
 








This paper explores how 4- to 5-year-old English-speaking children interpret 
sentences that contain three logical expressions: negation, the universal quantifier, 
and disjunction. It is instructive to look at how children interpret complex 
sentences like these, because it is unlikely that they have encountered many (or 
any) such sentences in the primary linguistic data. Therefore, the interpretations 
children assign to such sentences may be revealing about their innate knowledge 
of combinatory principles of logic. In the previous literature, children’s 
understanding of sentences with the universal quantifier and disjunction has 
been studied, but without negation. Let us begin by reviewing that literature, 
focusing on sentences without negation such as (1) and (2). Then we can 	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appreciate the consequences of introducing negation for semantic interpretation.  
 When disjunction appears in the subject phrase of a universally quantified 
sentence, as in (1a), it generates a conjunctive interpretation, as indicated in (1b). 
However, when disjunction appears in the predicate phrase, as in (2a), it licenses 
disjunctive truth conditions, as indicated in (2b). 
 
(1) Every passenger who ordered chicken or beef became ill. 
 a. Every SUBJ[passenger who ordered chicken OR beef] PRED[became ill]. 
 b. Meaning: every passenger who ordered chicken became ill AND every 
passenger who ordered beef became ill (AND every passenger who 
ordered both became ill).  
  
(2) Every passenger who became ill ordered chicken or beef. 
 a. Every SUBJ[passenger who became ill] PRED[ordered chicken OR beef]. 
 b. Meaning: every passenger who became ill ordered chicken OR beef 
(OR possibly both).  
 
 As these examples illustrate, there is an asymmetry in the interpretation of 
disjunction in (1) and (2) depending on the surface structure position of the 
disjunction word (in the subject phrase versus the predicate phrase). The 
asymmetry arises, first, because disjunction is assigned the truth conditions 
associated with inclusive-or, as in classical logic and, second, because the 
entailment relations of the subject phrase and the predicate phrase of the 
universal quantifier are reversed. Briefly, the subject phrase is downward 
entailing (licensing inferences from sets to their subsets), so disjunction is 
assigned a conjunctive interpretation when it appears in the subject phrase. By 
contrast, the predicate phrase of the universal quantifier is not downward 
entailing, so disjunction is assigned ‘disjunctive’ truth conditions, rather than a 
conjunctive interpretation, when it appears in the predicate phrase. A more 
detailed explanation of this asymmetry is given in section 1.1. 
 The previous literature on children’s acquisition of logical principles has 
emphasized the difficulty children would experience if they had to learn the 
meanings of logical expressions based on the input from adults (Crain et al. 2006, 
Crain et al. 2005, Crain & Khlentzos 2008, 2010, Crain & Thornton 2006). First 
consider, for example, how English-speaking children learn that ‘or’ is inclusive-
or, and not exclusive-or. This is problematic because ‘or’ is far more likely to 
appear in linguistic contexts that invite an exclusive-or interpretation, rather than 
an inclusive-or interpretation, in the spontaneous speech of both children and 
adults (Morris 2008). In a review of 240 transcriptions of audio-taped exchanges 
between 2- to 5-year-old children and their parents taken from the CHILDES 
database, Morris (2008) reports 465 uses of ‘or’ out of a total of 100,626 conver-
sational turns. For children, utterances in which disjunction meant inclusive-or 
were produced less than 10% of the time, and uses of ‘or’ with an inclusive-or 
interpretation were produced by adults only slightly more often than 10% of the 
time. A representative sample of input to Adam and Eve from the Brown corpus 
(Brown 1973) is provided in Crain et al. (2005), further illustrating the predomi-
nance of the exclusive-or interpretation of disjunction in the input to children.  
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 Further arguments against a learning account are based on the asymmetry 
in the truth conditions associated with disjunction when it appears in the subject 
phrase versus the predicate phrase of the universal quantifier. The universal 
quantifier is special in this regard. Other determiner phrases such as some Ns and 
no Ns assign the same truth conditions to disjunction when it appears in either 
argument. Disjunction is assigned a conjunctive interpretation in both arguments 
of no Ns, and disjunction is assigned disjunctive truth conditions in both 
arguments of some Ns. These determiner phrases, therefore, fail to support any 
substantive generalizations about the asymmetry in the interpretation of 
disjunction in sentences with the universal quantifier.  
 Worse still for a learning account is the fact that the input contains little, if 
any, information about how the universal quantifier and disjunction are 
interpreted when they appear together. We surveyed every adult utterance in the 
MacWhinney and Brown corpora in the CHILDES database; a total of 130,337 
utterances (Brown 1973, MacWhinney 2000). There were just two instances of 
disjunction in the predicate phrase of ‘every’, and there were no cases in which 
disjunction appeared in the subject phrase of sentences with ‘every’ (neither did 
disjunction occur in the subject phrase of sentences with ‘all’). Despite the paucity 
of evidence, previous research on child language has found that pre-school 
children know the asymmetry in the interpretation of disjunction in sentences 
like (1) and (2). In both English and in Mandarin Chinese, children have been 
shown to generate the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction in sentences like 
(1), but not in ones like (2) (Boster & Crain 1993, Chierchia et al. 2001, Chierchia et 
al. 2004, Gualmini et al. 2003, Su & Crain 2009). 
 To recap, children have been found to know the asymmetry in the 
interpretation of disjunction in the subject phrase versus the predicate phrase of 
the universal quantifier. This difference in interpretation hinges on two facts; first, 
that disjunction is inclusive-or and, second, that the universal quantifier (unlike 
some other quantifiers) interacts differently with (inclusive) disjunction when it 
appears in the subject phrase versus the predicate phrase. Yet, children have little 
direct experience bearing on either of these facts. The majority of their input is 
consistent with disjunction being exclusive-or, and children rarely encounter 
sentences that contain both disjunction and the universal quantifier.  
 Taken together, these observations about the input children receive, and 
about what children know about the meanings of complex sentences, seem 
inconsistent with a learning account of children’s knowledge of logical principles. 
The alternative is to suppose that children are innately endowed with knowledge 
of the relevant combinatory principles of logic. Further support for this 
innateness hypothesis is the finding that children even know the asymmetry 
between the two arguments of ‘every’ in sentences with the existential quantifier 
‘some’ and negation. This aspect of children’s knowledge of logical principles is 
particularly striking as this phenomenon involves three logical operators, as the 
sentences in (3) and (4) illustrate.  
 
(3) Every farmer who didn’t clean some animal has a broom. 
 a. Every SUBJ[farmer who did NOT clean SOME animal] PRED[has a broom]. 
 b. Every farmer who didn’t clean any animal has a broom. (not > some) 
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(4) Every farmer didn’t clean some animal. 
 a. Every SUBJ[farmer] PRED[did NOT clean SOME animal]. 
 b. For every farmer, there is some animal that he did not clean. 
  (some > not) 
 
 When negation and ‘some’ occur together in the subject phrase of a 
universally quantified sentence, as in (3a), negation takes scope over ‘some’, as 
indicated in (3b). We understand the sentence to mean that farmers who didn’t 
clean any animals at all have brooms. On the other hand, when negation and 
‘some’ occur together in the predicate phrase, as in (4a), ‘some’ is assigned wide 
scope over negation, as indicated in (4b). We understand the sentence to mean 
that every farmer did not clean at least one animal (although they probably 
cleaned some other animals). Gualmini (2005) tested 30 3- to 5-year-old English-
speaking children on sentences like these, and found that the child subjects 
correctly assigned opposing scope relations to negation and ‘some’ in these two 
linguistic environments.  
 Previous results have shown, therefore, that children are aware of the 
consequences of the asymmetry between the two arguments of the universal 
quantifier, and are able to demonstrate this knowledge even in sentences with 
three logical operators; sentences that they are unlikely to have ever come across. 
The present study was designed to take this important finding a step further. The 
study asks whether children are aware of the reversal of this asymmetry under 
negation. 
 Negation reverses entailment relations. Consider the interpretive 
consequences of adding negation to sentences (1) and (2). The results are 
sentences (5) and (6). While disjunction appears in the subject phrase of (5), it no 
longer generates a conjunctive interpretation, due to negation. However, 
disjunction now generates a conjunctive interpretation when it appears in the 
predicate phrase, as in (6).  
 
(5) Not every passenger who ordered chicken or beef became ill. 
a. Not every SUBJ[passenger who ordered chicken OR beef] PRED[became ill]. 
 b. Meaning: at least one passenger who ordered chicken OR beef was 
unaffected. 
 
(6) Not every passenger who became ill ordered chicken or beef.  
 a. Not every SUBJ[passenger who became ill] PRED[ordered chicken OR 
beef]. 
 b. Meaning: at least one passenger who became ill did not order chicken 
AND did not order beef.  
 
In short, there is an asymmetry in the interpretation of disjunction in (5) and (6), 
depending on the surface structure position of disjunction (whether it appears in 
the subject phrase versus the predicate phrase). However, the asymmetry is the 
reverse of that observed in examples (1) and (2). If it turns out that children know 
the asymmetry in the interpretation of disjunction in sentences like (5) and (6), as 
well as the reverse asymmetry in sentences like (1) and (2), then this will 
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constitute additional evidence that knowledge about combinatory principles of 
logic is available to children from the earliest stages of language acquisition. A 
learning account of these particular phenomena is highly problematic. We 
surveyed the MacWhinney and Brown corpora on the CHILDES database and 
found no instances of the compound quantifier ‘not every’. There were 40 adult 
utterances in which ‘not’ preceded the quantifier ‘all’, but none of them also 
included the disjunction operator. 
 The present study has another research aim. While we were conducting 
this study, we came across an unanticipated finding. It turned out that the adult 
English-speakers we interviewed judged sentences like (6) to be ambiguous. We 
repeat example (6), as (7) below, to illustrate the two adult interpretations. 
 
(7) Not every passenger who became ill ordered chicken or beef. 
 a. Meaning 1: At least one passenger who became ill did not order 
chicken AND did not order beef.  
 b. Meaning 2: It was chicken or beef that not every passenger who 
became ill ordered (at least one passenger who became ill did not order 
chicken, OR did not order beef, OR did not order either meat). 
 
On the reading indicated in 7(a), disjunction is interpreted within the scope of 
‘not every’, so the meaning can be paraphrased as follows: ‘There is at least one 
sick passenger who did not eat chicken AND who did not eat beef’. This is the 
conjunctive interpretation of disjunction. On the reading indicated in 7(b), by 
contrast, disjunction is interpreted as taking wider scope than ‘not every’, so the 
meaning can be paraphrased as follows: ‘It was chicken OR beef that not every 
passenger who became ill ordered’. In other words, the sentence is true if either 
(a) some sick passenger did not eat chicken (but did eat beef), or (b) some sick 
passenger did not eat beef (but did eat chicken), or if some sick passenger did not 
either dish. This is the disjunctive interpretation. Although the disjunctive 
interpretation is not the preferred reading for adult speakers of English, we 
discovered in the course of our study that it is available to many adult speakers. 
Given that two readings are possible for sentences like (7), children too must be 
faced with this ambiguity. This means that we also need to address the question 
of which of these two readings constitutes children’s initial hypothesis.  
 In answering this question, we began with the observation that one of the 
readings of (7), 7(a), asymmetrically entails the other reading, 7(b). That is, (7) is 
true on the meaning represented in 7(a) in just one circumstance. The same 
circumstance makes sentence (7) true when it is assigned the meaning in 7(b), but 
there are other circumstances that also make (7) true on the meaning represented 
in 7(b). Simply put, 7(a) is the subset reading, and 7(b) is the superset reading. 
This phenomenon is a semantic version of the familiar subset problem described 
by Berwick (1985) and by Pinker (1984). Both of these researchers observed that a 
learnability problem could arise for children when one language generates a 
subset of the sentences generated by another language. In the absence of negative 
evidence, children are compelled to initially adopt the ‘subset’ language.  
 Since the early 1990’s, it has been claimed, albeit controversially, that when 
children are presented with a semantic ambiguity of the kind in (7), that they are 
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also guided by a learnability constraint that compels them to initially adopt the 
subset interpretation (7a) in order to guarantee that the superset reading (7b) can 
be learned from positive evidence, if the superset interpretation is assigned by 
adult speakers of the local language (Crain et al. 1994). This constraint on 
semantic interpretation was initially called the Semantic Subset Principle, to dis-
tinguish it from the (syntactic) Subset Principle proposed originally by Berwick 
and by Pinker, but it has recently been reformulated as the Semantic Subset 
Maxim in order to handle cases of scope ambiguity (Notley et al. 2011). According 
to the Semantic Subset Maxim, children should initially prefer the scope assign-
ment that generates the conjunctive interpretation 7(a). The present study is de-
signed to test this prediction.  
 To sum up, the present study has two goals. The first goal is to determine 
whether children are aware of the asymmetry in the interpretation of disjunction 
in the two arguments of the complex quantifier ‘not every’. If so, children should 
assign a disjunctive interpretation to disjunction in the first argument, the subject 
phrase, and children should assign a conjunctive interpretation to disjunction in 
the second argument, the predicate phrase. To arrive at these two different inter-
pretations of disjunction, children must apply intricate combinatory principles of 
logic, based on the meanings of logical expressions. Our first goal, then, is to 
determine the extent to which (first-order) logic determines both the underlying 
semantics of various logical operators and whether logic dictates how the mean-
ings of these logical operators are combined for children. We have documented 
that these principles are not amply demonstrated in the input. Therefore, if 
children successfully process the interpretations of complex sentences with 
multiple logical operators, this can be taken as evidence that they have innate 
knowledge of the combinatory principles of (first order) logic. Moreover, this 
evidence will extend current findings to a complex quantifier that is subject to a 
logical equivalence rule not yet investigated in the literature. The second goal of 
the study is to test the predictions of the Semantic Subset Maxim concerning 
children’s initial hypotheses when they are presented with certain kinds of 
semantic scope ambiguities. 
 The paper is organized as follows. First, we will present the logical 
principles that are responsible for the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction in 
certain contexts, as opposed to the disjunctive interpretation. For each principle 
we will also review some relevant child acquisition data supporting the view that 
the principle is innately specified, rather than learned. This background will then 
allow us to understand what logical knowledge children need in order to 
compute the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction in the predicate phrase, but 
not in the subject phrase of the compound quantifier ‘not every’. We will then 
introduce the rationale behind the Semantic Subset Maxim and review some 
current support for this maxim. Finally, we will outline how our study further 
tests both the Semantic Subset Maxim, and the logical principles that are at play 
when children comprehend sentences that contain ‘not every’ and disjunction.  
 
1.1. The Source of the Conjunctive Interpretation of Disjunction 
 
A conjunctive interpretation of disjunction arises when disjunction is interpreted 
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in the scope of a downward entailing (DE) operator. To access this interpretation 
children must know the underlying meaning of disjunction, and they must know 
which expressions in natural language are downward entailing. These two 
logical facts are outlined below, along with what research studies have 
determined to date about children’s sensitivity to each of these facts. 
 
1.1.1. Logical Fact 1: OR in Natural Language is Inclusive-Or 
 
The first logical fact is that the meaning of disjunction in natural language is 
inclusive-or. In considering the input containing the disjunction operator (‘or’ in 
English), the underlying meaning of this logical operator is not immediately clear, 
even in cases where the inclusive-or interpretation of disjunction is permitted. 
Compare sentences (8) and (9) in a context in which there are blue, green and red 
balloons for Eric to choose from.  
 
(8) Eric wants a red balloon or a green balloon. 
 
(9) I bet Eric will choose a red balloon or a green balloon. 
 
In response to (8), hearers generally infer that Eric wants just one balloon, either a 
red one or a green one. This is the exclusive-or reading of disjunction, according 
to which exactly one of the disjuncts is true. In response to (9), hearers generally 
infer that the speaker has made a correct prediction, so long as Eric chooses a red 
balloon or a green balloon, or both (but not a blue balloon). This is the inclusive-
or reading of disjunction, which includes the possibility that both disjuncts are 
true. 
 Note, however, that the inclusive-or meaning of disjunction generates the 
truth conditions that are associated with the exclusive-or meaning. Based on this 
observation, among others, it has been argued that disjunction is always 
inclusive-or and that the exclusive-or meaning is derived when the additional 
truth condition that is associated with inclusive-or (where both disjuncts are true) 
is suppressed due to a conversational implicature. The implicature arises because 
the logical operators OR and AND form a scale, based on information strength. On 
the scale containing AND and OR, statements with AND are stronger than the 
corresponding statements with OR, where a term α is ‘stronger’ than another term 
β if α asymmetrically entails β. Since the truth conditions assigned to ‘P and Q’ 
are a subset of the truth conditions of ‘P or Q’, statements with AND 
asymmetrically entail the corresponding statements with OR, which are true in a 
wider range of circumstances. Following the Gricean conversational maxim of 
quantity (which entreats speakers to make their contributions as informative as 
possible), hearers generally assume that if a speaker uses OR, he or she is not in a 
position to use the stronger term AND to describe the situation under 
consideration (Grice 1975). Hearers therefore remove the truth conditions 
associated with AND from the ‘basic’ meaning of OR, yielding the exclusive-or 
reading of disjunctive statements (Horn 1996).  
 It turns out that children are sensitive to the fact that the underlying 
meaning of OR is inclusive-or. As noted earlier, reviews of the input to English-
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speaking children on the CHILDES database reveal that, overwhelmingly, 
children hear sentences in which an exclusive-or meaning of disjunction is 
intended. In spite of the paucity of relevant input, several experimental studies 
have shown that 3- to 6-year-old children access an inclusive-or reading when 
disjunction words are presented in a context that is felicitous for this reading, 
such as in the antecedent of a conditional statement (Chierchia et al. 2004, Crain et 
al. 2000, Gualmini et al. 2000).  
 
1.1.2. Logical Fact 2: Downward Entailing Expressions License Inferences from Sets to 
Subsets 
 
The second logical fact is that there exists a class of expressions in human 
languages that are called DOWNWARD ENTAILING (DE), and these expressions 
license logically valid inferences from sets to subsets. This class encompasses 
both negative expressions like NOT, NONE, and WITHOUT, as well as non-negative 
expressions like the universal quantifier EVERY and the temporal conjunction 
BEFORE. Despite syntactic and semantic differences among these expressions, they 
form a natural class in human languages because they license downward 
entailing inferences from general terms (e.g., ‘Romance language’) to more 
specific terms (e.g., ‘French’).  
 Consider the statement ‘John did not learn a Romance language’. This 
statement contains negation (‘not’) and the general term ‘Romance language’. If 
this statement is true, then it logically follows that the statement ‘John did not 
learn French’ is also true, where the general term ‘Romance language’ has been 
replaced by the specific term ‘French’. The universal quantifier ‘every’ also 
validates inferences from general terms to specific terms, so if the statement 
‘Every Romance language is offered for study at this university’ is true, then it 
must also be true that ‘French is offered for study at this university’. Note, 
however, that, as we discussed above, the universal quantifier presents an 
asymmetry across its arguments. It is only downward entailing on its first 
argument, and not on its second argument. So, ‘Every student is taking a 
Romance language’ does not necessarily entail that every student is taking 
French.  
 Child language acquisition data again provide evidence that children are 
sensitive to downward entailment (DE) in natural language, because children 
have been found to use this property to master a set of apparently unrelated 
linguistic facts. DE expressions have two main diagnostic properties. The first is 
that they license negative polarity items like ‘any’. The second is that they license 
the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction. On a learning approach, one would 
expect children to master these two logical operators piecemeal, as they amass 
relevant input for each operator. On a nativist approach, by contrast, one would 
expect both properties to emerge together as early as they can be tested.  
 Let’s look at the evidence that children know about the first diagnostic 
property of DE expressions. As the examples in (10) illustrate, the use of ‘any’ is 
licensed in DE contexts. By contrast, non-downward entailing contexts do not 
tolerate negative polarity items such as ‘any’. Without a DE operator, sentences 
with ‘any’ are ungrammatical, as illustrated in (11). 
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(10) a. Eric did not apply for any scholarship. 
 b. Every student of any Romance language should apply for a 
scholarship. 
 c. Benjamin applied for a scholarship before any other student.  
 
(11) a.      * Eric applied for any scholarship. 
 b.      * Every student who applied for a scholarship studies any Romance 
language. 
 c.      * Benjamin applied for a scholarship after any other student. 
 
It has been shown that children adhere to this restriction on the use of negative 
polarity items from the earliest stages of language acquisition. Large-scale 
reviews of the spontaneous production data of both English-speaking children 
(aged 0;1–5;2) and Dutch-speaking children (aged 1;5–3;10) have revealed 
children almost never produce negative polarity items without a downward 
entailing licensor of some sort (Tieu 2010, van der Wal 1996). 1  In elicited 
production tasks, it has also been found that children do not produce negative 
polarity items in non-downward entailing environments, while they do produce 
them in downward entailing environments (Crain & Thornton 2006, O’Leary 
1994, van der Wal 1996). The fact that children avoid and produce negative 
polarity items in just the right contexts shows that they are sensitive to the 
difference between downward entailing environments and non-downward 
entailing environments.  
 It is conceivable that children master the distribution of negative polarity 
items by keeping track of the statistical likelihood of each negative polarity item 
appearing in a range of linguistic environments. They could then use this 
information to classify which expressions in natural language are downward 
entailing. Even if this were the case, however, we would not necessarily expect 
children to be sensitive to the second diagnostic property of downward entailing 
expressions, the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction, at the same early stage 
of language development. If, on the other hand, children are innately sensitive to 
which expressions in language are and are not downward entailing, then we 
would expect them to compute a conjunctive interpretation of disjunction in DE 
environments as soon as they can be tested. In the next section, we will explain 
why this interpretation arises, before reviewing the available evidence showing 
that children do, indeed, access this interpretation. We will then look specifically 
at how the compound quantifier ‘not every’ also demonstrates this property. 
 
1.1.3. The Conjunctive Interpretation of Disjunction in the Scope of a DE Expression 
 
Downward entailing operators license a conjunctive interpretation of disjunction 
in one of two ways, depending on the type of DE operator in question. In both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    1 Children’s utterances may still be non-adult like at an early stage because they choose to use 
a downward entailing operator which is not the most appropriate in a certain context, or 
they use pseudo-licensing strategies (e.g., anaphoric ‘no’, headshaking, intonation contour) 
until their negation vocabulary has expanded enough to give them access to the correct 
variety of licensors (van der Waal, 1996).  
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cases, however, the conjunctive interpretation depends on the disjunction 
operator being assigned the truth conditions associated with inclusive dis-
junction (inclusive-or).  
 The first way the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction can arise pertains 
to all negatively flavored DE operators. We will illustrate using negation, as in 
(12). 
 
(12) John will not eat broccoli or cauliflower. 
 ⇒ John will not eat broccoli and John will not eat cauliflower. 
 
When disjunction is interpreted in the scope of negation, sentence (12) is 
understood to entail that John will not eat broccoli AND that John will not eat 
cauliflower. The logic is as follows. Ordinary statements with inclusive-or are 
true in three circumstances, just as in classical logic. In classical logic, a statement 
of the form ‘P or Q’ is true if: 
 
(i) P is true (but Q is not), or  
(ii) Q is true (but P is not), or  
(iii) both P and Q are true.  
 
This means that ‘P or Q’ is false in just one circumstance: when neither P nor Q is 
true. When ‘or’ is negated, the truth conditions for inclusive-or are reversed. So 
‘not (P or Q)’ is true in the one circumstance in which ‘P or Q’ is false, namely 
when neither P nor Q is true. This relationship is captured in one of de Morgan’s 
laws of propositional logic (de Morgan, 1966), where the symbol ‘¬’ stands for 
‘not’, the symbol ‘∨’ stands for ‘or’, and the symbol ‘∧’ stands for ‘and’:  
 
(13) ¬(P ∨ Q) ⇒ ¬P ∧ ¬Q 
 
The second way the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction can arise pertains to 
all DE operators containing the universal quantifier in their semantics. We will 
illustrate using ‘every’, as in (1), repeated here as (14).  
 
(14) Every passenger who ordered chicken or beef became ill. 
⇒ every passenger who ordered chicken became ill AND every passenger 
who ordered beef became ill (AND every passenger who ordered both 
became ill).  
 
Sentence (14) is understood to entail that passengers who ordered chicken 
became ill AND passengers who ordered beef became ill. The logic, in this case, 
depends on the set relations that ‘every’ creates when it is in construction with a 
noun phrase that contains disjunction, such as ‘every passenger who ordered 
chicken or beef’. A sentence containing a quantificational determiner is divided 
into three parts for the purpose of meaning computation: the quantifier, the 
restrictor and the nuclear scope (Heim 1988). The restrictor is the noun phrase 
with which the quantificational determiner combines syntactically. The nuclear 
scope is the predicate phrase. In the restrictor in (14), ‘or’ is used to partition the 
universally quantified superset ‘every passenger’ into two subsets ‘passengers 
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who ordered chicken’ and ‘passengers who ordered beef’. The quantificational 
expression ‘every passenger who ordered chicken or beef’ refers to the entirety of 
the partitioned superset of passengers. This superset then necessarily includes:  
 
(i) passengers who ordered chicken, 
(ii) passengers who ordered beef, and  
(iii) passengers who ordered both chicken and beef. 
 
Here, the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction arises because all THREE 
circumstances associated with inclusive-or must be true in order to guarantee the 
truth of the universally quantified statement. This contrasts with the conjunctive 
interpretation of disjunction in cases like (12), in which only ONE truth condition 
is satisfied: the one in which both disjuncts are false.  
 Once again, the evidence from the child language acquisition literature 
demonstrates that children are sensitive to this diagnostic property of downward 
entailing expressions, whether the DE expression is negatively or non-negatively 
flavored. Negative DE expressions which have been investigated include 
negation and the quantifier ‘none’. It has been shown that both English- and 
Japanese-speaking 3- to 5-year-old children consistently assign a conjunctive 
interpretation to disjunction when it appears with negation in sentences like ‘The 
pig did not eat a carrot or a pepper’. They reject the sentence as a description of a 
context in which the pig did not eat a carrot, but did eat a pepper (Crain et al. 
2002, Goro & Akiba 2004a, b, Gualmini 2005, Gualmini & Crain 2005). This result 
has also been shown to hold in child English for the operator ‘none’ (Gualmini & 
Crain 2002). 
 Non-negative DE expressions which have been investigated include the 
temporal conjunction ‘before’ and the universal quantifier ‘every’. It has been 
shown that both English- and Mandarin-speaking children consistently assign a 
conjunctive interpretation to disjunction when it appears with BEFORE in 
sentences like ‘The dog reached the finish line before the turtle or the bunny’. On 
the conjunctive interpretation, the sentence means that the dog reached the finish 
line before the turtle AND before the bunny. Children reject such sentences as a 
description of a context in which a dog, a turtle and a bunny run a race, and the 
dog comes second (Notley et al. 2011). Furthermore, as we discussed in the 
introduction, both English- and Mandarin-speaking children have been shown to 
generate the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction in the subject phrase of the 
universal quantifier, but not in the predicate phrase. They reject sentences like 
‘every princess who picked a red flower or a white flower received a jewel’ in 
contexts in which, for example, only princesses who picked red flowers received 
a jewel, and they accept sentences like ‘every princess with a jewel picked a red 
flower or a white flower’ in contexts in which every princess with a jewel picked 
a red flower (Boster & Crain 1993, Chierchia et al. 2001, Chierchia et al. 2004, 
Gualmini et al. 2003, Su & Crain 2009).  
 
1.2. The Conjunctive Interpretation of Disjunction in the Nuclear Scope of ‘Not Every’ 
 
Now let’s consider how the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction arises in 
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sentences containing the compound quantifier ‘not every’. As we have pointed 
out, negation reverses the entailment relations typical of ‘every’: ‘not every’ is 
downward entailing on its nuclear scope (predicate phrase), and not on its 
restrictor (subject phrase). Recall examples (5) and (6), repeated as (15) and (16). 
 
(15) Not every passenger who ordered chicken or beef became ill. 
 a. Not every REST[passenger who ordered chicken OR beef] SCOPE[became ill]. 
 b. Meaning: At least one passenger who ordered chicken OR beef was 
unaffected. 
 
(16) Not every passenger who became ill ordered chicken or beef.  
 a. Not every REST[passenger who became ill] SCOPE[ordered chicken OR beef]. 
 b. Meaning: At least one passenger who became ill did not order chicken 
AND did not order beef.  
 
If disjunction is interpreted in the nuclear scope (predicate phrase) of ‘not every’ 
in (16), then a conjunctive interpretation is assigned to disjunction, such that that 
there must be at least one sick passenger in the context who did not order chicken 
AND who did not order beef. To arrive at this meaning, two combinatory logical 
principles are required. The first dictates that ‘not every’ is logically equivalent in 
meaning to ‘some not’. This logical equivalence can be represented by the logical 
rule given in (17) where the symbol ‘∀’ stands for the universal quantifier ‘every’, 
the symbol ‘∃’ stands for the existential quantifier ‘some’, A represents the 
restrictor, and B represents the nuclear scope. The meaning rule in (17) says that 
‘Not every A has the property B’ is logically equivalent in meaning to ‘Some A 
does not have the property B’. We will call this the ‘not every = some not’ 
equivalence. 
 
(17) ¬ ∀ (A) (B) ⇒ ∃ (A) ¬(B)  
 
When (17) is applied to sentence (16), a covert negation operator ‘not’ is made to 
act on the nuclear scope of the sentence: ‘ordered chicken or beef’. This, in turn, 
means that the disjunction operator contained within the nuclear scope gets 
interpreted as if it were appearing in an overt negative downward entailing 
environment. Then, through the application of a second logical principle, namely 
de Morgan’s law illustrated in (13), the conjunctive interpretation is computed. 
On the other hand, when (17) is applied to sentence (15), disjunction gets 
interpreted as if it were appearing in the restrictor of the existential quantifier. 
This is an upward entailing environment, not a downward entailing one. 
Subsequently, the meaning of (15) is that there must be at least one passenger 
who did not order chicken, or at least one passenger who did not order beef, who 
did not become ill, not one of each. 
 The reversal of entailment relations between ‘every’ and ‘not every’ 
provides us with a way of further testing whether the logical principles we have 
discussed are available to children from the outset of the acquisition of language. 
In the present study, the goal is to see whether or not children are sensitive the 
entailment expressed in (17). If so, then children are expected to assign a 
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conjunctive interpretation to disjunction when it appears in the nuclear scope of 
‘not every’, but not when it appears in the restrictor.  
 We should point out here that our study was not designed to test whether 
children also cancel the scalar implicature associated with disjunction when it 
appears in the nuclear scope of ‘not every’, as opposed to the restrictor. Another 
notable feature of DE environments is the cancellation (or reversal) of scalar 
implicatures (Atlas & Levinson 1981). As discussed earlier, disjunction is subject 
to a scalar implicature in ordinary (positive) contexts, including the predicate 
phrase of the universal quantifier. That is why adult speakers generally reject a 
sentence like ‘Every passenger who became ill ordered chicken or beef’ as an 
accurate description of a context in which every sick passenger ordered both 
chicken and beef. Due to the application of a scalar implicature, hearers remove 
the truth condition on which every passenger ordered both meats. However, 
hearers judge a sentence like (14), ‘Every passenger who ordered chicken or beef 
became ill’ to be true in exactly the same context. Because disjunction appears in 
the restrictor in (14), a downward entailing environment, the scalar implicature is 
cancelled, so hearers do not remove the truth condition on which every 
passenger ordered both meats from their interpretation. Indeed, this truth 
condition cannot be removed, because, due to the conjunctive interpretation of 
disjunction, all three truth conditions associated with disjunction hold in a 
universally quantified DE environment.  
 Notice, however, that it is not necessary to consider whether scalar 
implicatures are cancelled in order to see the conjunctive interpretation of 
disjunction at work in universally quantified contexts. For example, if a 
conjunctive interpretation of disjunction is computed in (14), then even if there 
are no passengers who ordered both kinds of meat, it is still necessary for both 
other truth conditions to be true: (i) that all sick passengers who ordered chicken 
became ill, and (ii) that all sick passengers who ordered beef became ill. If the 
conjunctive interpretation were not computed, then (14) could be true if only one 
of the truth conditions (i) or (ii) were true, but not both. In other words, if our 
goal is to determine whether or not a conjunctive interpretation of disjunction is 
computed in the restrictor of the universal quantifier, we do not need to worry 
about representing truth condition (iii) in the experimental workspace, according 
to which passengers who ordered both chicken and beef became ill. We can 
determine this by seeing if speakers reject (14) when just (i) or just (ii) is true, but 
accept (14) when both (i) and (ii) are true. We draw attention to this because the 
experimental contexts we use in the present study focus only on the first two 
possible truth conditions of our test sentences. We use these contexts to test 
whether children possibly (erroneously) access a conjunctive interpretation of 
disjunction in the restrictor of ‘not every’, not whether they cancel the relevant 
scalar implicature.  
 Having introduced the logic behind the interpretations assigned to 
disjunction in the restrictor and nuclear scope of ‘not every’, we now discuss the 
possible semantic scope ambiguity associated with sentences like (16), ‘not every 
passenger who became ill ordered chicken or beef’. To do so, we introduce some 
background about cases of semantic scope ambiguity involving disjunction and 
downward entailing operators in general, before moving on to the case of ‘not 
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every’. We will then discuss the Semantic Subset Maxim, which makes a specific 
prediction about how children will resolve ambiguities of this kind.  
 
1.3. Cross-Linguistic Differences in Semantic Scope Assignment 
 
The logical principles we have presented (that the meaning of disjunction is 
inclusive-or; that DE expressions form a natural logical class; and that disjunction 
is assigned a conjunctive interpretation in DE environments) are proposed to be 
universal principles of all natural languages. There are, however, some 
interesting cross-linguistic differences in how various languages interpret sen-
tences containing disjunction and a downward entailing operator, demonstrating 
that these sentences are subject to semantic scope ambiguity.  
 For example, sentences containing the DE operator negation and 
disjunction like (12), ‘John will not eat broccoli or cauliflower’, actually have two 
possible interpretations. If disjunction is interpreted in the scope of negation, a 
conjunctive interpretation arises. Languages which prefer this scope assignment 
include English, German, French, Greek, Romanian, Bulgarian, and Korean 
(Szabolcsi 2002). If, on the other hand, disjunction is interpreted outside the scope 
of negation, no conjunctive interpretation arises. For example, in Japanese, 
sentence (18) is typically interpreted to mean ‘it is broccoli or a cauliflower that 
Taro will not eat (I’m not sure which one)’.2 
 
(18) Taro-wa  burokkori ka  karifurawa-o  tabe-nai.   Japanese 
 Taro-TOP  broccoli  or  cauliflower-ACC  eat-NEG 
 ‘Taro will not eat broccoli or cauliflower.’ 
⇒ ‘It is broccoli or cauliflower that Taro will not eat (I’m not sure which one).’ 
 
Other languages that prefer for disjunction to be interpreted as taking scope over 
negation in simple negative sentences include Hungarian, Mandarin, Russian, 
Serbo-Croatian, Slovak, and Polish (Goro & Akiba 2004a, b, Szabolcsi 2002). Due 
to the relation allowed between disjunction and negation in languages like these, 
disjunction typically implies exclusivity (e.g., ‘it is either broccoli or cauliflower 
(but not both) that Taro doesn’t like’). This is because disjunction is subject to 
exactly the same scalar implicature as it is when it appears in a sentence without 
negation.  
 This account of the interpretive differences between languages maintains 
that the basic meaning of disjunction in all human languages is inclusive-or, and 
that when inclusive-or appears in the semantic scope of a DE operator a 
conjunctive interpretation will necessarily be generated. In languages like 
Japanese in which an exclusive-or reading of disjunction is assigned to sentences 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    2 The notion of scope under consideration does not depend on one operator appearing in a 
‘higher’ structural position than the other in the syntactic tree corresponding to the sentence 
that is uttered (i.e. at spell-out). In both English and Japanese, negation is typically analyzed 
as residing in a higher node in the syntactic tree than disjunction, at spell-out. Nonetheless, 
disjunction is interpreted as taking semantic scope over negation in Japanese sentences like 
(18). To account for this reading in languages like Japanese, it is generally posited that 
disjunction has moved covertly at the level of logical form to a higher node in the syntactic 
tree for the computation of the sentence meaning. 
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like (18), it is supposed that disjunction takes semantic scope over negation. The 
disjunction operator is therefore not in a DE environment, and no conjunctive 
interpretation is generated.  
 Just as sentences containing negation and disjunction can be ambiguous, 
we discovered that sentences containing ‘not every’ and disjunction can also be 
ambiguous. Note that this ambiguity does not arise in sentences containing 
‘every’. This is because when disjunction occurs in the restrictor of a quantifier, it 
is bound by that quantifier, and must be interpreted in its scope. When 
disjunction occurs in the nuclear scope of a quantifier, by contrast, two 
alternative scope relations become available. However, when disjunction occurs 
in the non-downward entailing nuclear scope of ‘every’ it receives its normal dis-
junctive interpretation regardless of the semantic scope of this quantifier (com-
pare ‘every princess picked a red flower or a white flower’ to ‘it was a red flower 
or a white flower that every princess picked’). On the other hand, when dis-
junction occurs in the downward entailing nuclear scope of ‘not every’, two dif-
ferent readings are available. For example, sentence (7), repeated here as (19), 
receives two interpretations. If ‘not every’ takes scope over disjunction, dis-
junction receives the conjunctive interpretation indicated in 19(a). If disjunction 
takes scope over ‘not every’, disjunction receives the disjunctive interpretation 
indicated in 19(b). This is not the preferred interpretation for English-speaking 
adults, but it is a possible interpretation, as we will see in the results section.  
  
(19) Not every passenger who became ill ordered chicken or beef.  
 a. Meaning 1: at least one passenger who became ill did not order chicken 
AND did not order beef. 
 b. Meaning 2: it was chicken or beef that not every passenger who became 
ill ordered.  
 
It turns out that the two readings available for sentence (19) form a subset-
superset relationship. That is, on the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction in 
19(a), the only circumstance that will make the sentence true is if there is some 
sick passenger who ordered neither of the meats in question. On the alternative 
interpretation, in which disjunction takes scope over negation, there are three 
logical circumstances which will make the sentence true: (i) if some sick 
passenger didn’t order chicken, but did order beef, or (ii) if some sick passenger 
didn’t order beef, but did order chicken, or (iii) if some sick passenger ordered 
neither meat. The circumstances that would make the sentence true on a 
conjunctive interpretation are thus contained within the circumstances that 
would make the sentence true on a disjunctive interpretation. It has been 
proposed that in a situation like this, children should be constrained by 
learnability considerations as to which reading they will initially hypothesize. We 
outline this hypothesis and its prediction for our study in the next section. 
 
1.4. The Semantic Subset Maxim (SSM) 
 
The Semantic Subset Maxim (SSM) becomes operative when a sentence has two 
possible scope interpretations, and these two interpretations form a subset-
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superset relationship. Once engaged, the SSM compels children to initially favor 
the reading that makes the sentence true in the narrowest range of circumstances, 
the subset reading (see Notley et al. 2011). The rationale behind the SSM is that it 
prevents unnecessary delays for children in acquiring the scope assignment 
preferences manifested by adult speakers of the local language. If children are 
acquiring a language in which the superset reading of a sentence is favored by 
adult speakers, then the SSM guarantees that children who have an initial 
preference for the subset reading will encounter positive evidence in the input 
demonstrating that the sentence is true on a wider set of interpretations. Based on 
the evidence, children will then be able to quickly align their preferences with 
those of adult speakers. If, on the other hand, children initially favor the superset 
reading, then the majority of the input they receive will always be consistent with 
that interpretation, including input from speakers who strongly prefer a subset 
reading. It would therefore take children considerably longer to align their 
preferences with those of the adults around them on this scenario. 
 The findings we discussed previously showing that children, across 
languages, assign a conjunctive interpretation to disjunction in various 
downward entailing contexts provide support for the SSM. In particular, the 
results showing that Japanese- and Mandarin-speaking children prefer to assign 
a subset conjunctive interpretation to sentences like ‘the pig did not eat the carrot 
or the pepper’ or ‘the dog reached the finish line before the turtle or the bunny’ 
are particularly telling. This is because, in these languages, adult controls actually 
preferred or, at least, allowed a superset reading in which disjunction was 
assigned wide scope over the DE operator in question (Goro & Akiba 2004b, 
Notley et al. 2011).  
 We can use the scope ambiguity introduced in sentences containing ‘not 
every’ and disjunction to further test the SSM. The SSM would predict that 
children should strongly prefer to assign the conjunctive interpretation, 19(a), to 
sentences like (19). The conjunctive interpretation makes the sentence true in the 
narrowest set of circumstances. Children can then easily expand their scope 
preferences to include alternative interpretations based on positive evidence 
provided by adult language users.3 We turn now to our methodology, explaining 
how our study was designed to both test the logical principles outlined, and the 





To test children’s interpretation of disjunction in the nuclear scope and restrictor 
of ‘not every’ we designed a truth value judgment task (TVJT). This research 
technique is designed to investigate which meanings children can and cannot 
assign to sentences (Crain & Thornton 1998). The task involves two experi-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    3 We are not committed to this evidence coming from sentences like (19) being used in a 
context in which, for example, not every sick passenger ate chicken, but every sick 
passenger did eat beef. Evidence from other types of sentences containing a DE operator 
and disjunction, used in a context in which disjunction is interpreted as scoping over the DE 
operator, would probably suffice. 
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menters — one acting out stories with toy characters and props, and the other 
playing the role of a puppet who watches the stories alongside the child. At the 
end of each story, the puppet explains to the child subject what he thinks 
happened in the story. The child’s task is to decide whether the puppet said the 
right thing or not. If the child informs the puppet that he was wrong, then the 
child is asked to explain to the puppet what really happened. There were two test 
conditions: one in which ‘or’ appeared in the nuclear scope of ‘not every’; and 
one in which ‘or’ appeared in the restrictor of ‘not every’. We will refer to these 
conditions as the ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ condition and the ‘Restrictor OR’ condition. 
Each condition had 4 trials, yielding 8 different test items. Each condition is 
illustrated below, followed by the relevant predictions. 
 
2.1. ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ Condition 
 
In the ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ condition there were four test stories like this one: 
 
“Here is an enchanted castle where there is some hidden treasure: 
silver stars, crystal shells, and golden crowns. And here are four 
princesses who have been having a picnic in the woods nearby, and 
are now walking home. One of the princesses spies the palace. “Oh 
what a beautiful palace,” she says. “Let’s go and see what’s inside.” 
They go in and see some crystal shells. Two of the princesses take a 
shell each. The other two want to look for something better. Then the 
princesses go upstairs. The two princesses with shells see a pile of 
silver stars — they each take one. The other two still want to look for 
something better. They continue looking and find a secret room with 
golden crowns in it. But they already have crowns on their heads. So 
they decide not to take the crowns. Instead, they go back to the pile of 
stars and each take one. The princesses are happy with the treasure 
they have chosen to take home.” 
 
  
Figure 1:  FALSE ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ Condition 
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Figure 1, which corresponds to the scene at the end of the story, illustrates this 
condition. After the story, the puppet watching alongside the child uttered test 
sentence (20) to describe what he thought happened in the story. Note that each 
test sentence was preceded by a positive lead-in, such as ‘every princess took 
some treasure’. This was because it has been shown that negative statements 
about stories are often pragmatically infelicitous and can lead to irrelevant errors 
by child subjects. A positive lead-in sentence preceding the negative statement 
helps to satisfy the pragmatic felicity conditions associated with negation and, as 
a consequence, is likely to reduce the number of irrelevant errors committed by 
children (Gualmini 2005, Musolino & Lidz 2006).  
 
(20) That was a story about four princesses looking for treasure. Every princess 
took some treasure and I know: Not every princess took a shell or a star. 
 
On the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction, (20) is true if there is at least one 
princess who did not take a shell and who did not take a star. However, in all 4 
trials in this condition, the context was, in fact, designed to make this reading 
false. For example, in our princess story, even though some princesses didn’t take 
shells, they all did take stars. There was therefore no princess who did not take a 
shell and who did not take a star.  
 Part of the TVJT methodology recommends that when making a test 
sentence false, the context should fulfill the condition of plausible dissent. That is, 
the context should make clear to the child another possible outcome on which the 
test sentence would have been true. So, in all our ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ stories, a 
possible outcome was outlined in which two of the four characters might not 
have done either of the actions mentioned. For example, in the case of the 
princesses, two princesses did not take shells, and they also initially rejected stars, 
in search of something better. They almost took some crowns. This would have 
made test sentence (20) true on a conjunctive interpretation of disjunction. Finally, 
however, the princesses decided that they didn’t need crowns because they 
already had crowns, so, in the end, they each took a star. By including a positive 
lead-in and satisfying the condition of plausible dissent, it is unlikely that 
children’s responses in this task are due to pragmatic confusion. In addition, we 
always ordered the disjuncts so that the disjunct that made each test sentence 
false on the conjunctive interpretation was second. In this way we ruled out the 
possibility that children’s rejections were due to the fact that they only listened to 
the first part of a test sentence (e.g., not every princess took a shell). If this were 
the case, the child would accept, not reject, the test sentences. 
 While the context of all the stories in the ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ condition 
made the test sentences false on the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction, the 
stories were also designed to make the test sentences true if children, in fact, do 
not compute the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction in the nuclear scope of 
‘not every’. They might do this either because they prefer a reading on which 
disjunction scopes over ‘not every’, or because, even though they assign ‘not 
every’ scope over disjunction, they do not apply the necessary logical principles 
in these contexts. In either case, sentence (20) could possibly mean ‘not every 
princess took a shell OR not every princess took a star (OR not every princess took 
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a star or a shell)’. In our princess story, it was true that not every princess took a 
shell, making the overall disjunctive statement ‘Not every princess took a shell 
OR not every princess took a star’ true.  
 Let’s now consider what our prediction in this condition is. To reject the 
test sentences in this condition, children must (a) recognize that ‘not every’ is 
downward entailing on its nuclear scope, and (b) assign ‘not every’ semantic 
scope over ‘or’. Only the combination of these two conditions will ensure that 
children are then able to calculate a conjunctive interpretation of disjunction, and 
reject the test sentences. Therefore, a majority of child rejections in the ‘Nuclear 
Scope OR’ condition will show, first, that children are guided by the logical 
principles presented. Moreover, this will be new evidence that children make 
complex logical computations involving the ‘not every = some not’ equivalence. 
Second, rejections in this condition will constitute support for the Semantic 
Subset Maxim (which encourages children to favor the scope assignment which 
leads to a narrower, stronger reading of the sentence in question).  
 On the other hand, child acceptances in this condition could be indicative 
of two states of affairs. It could be that children are aware of the logical principles, 
but that they assign ‘or’ semantic scope over ‘not every’. This would be evidence 
against the Semantic Subset Maxim, as by assigning ‘or’ semantic scope over ‘not 
every’, children access a wider possible meaning of test sentences like (20). 
Alternatively, it could be that children do not recognize that ‘not every’ is 
downward entailing on its nuclear scope. The relevant prediction is summarized 
below.  
 
Prediction 1: If children are guided by innate logical principles, and by the SSM, 
then they should reject the ‘Nuclear Scope-OR’ test sentences (at a 
rate at least higher than 50% across children). If children are not 
guided by logical principles and the SSM, they could accept the 
sentences.  
 
2.2. ‘Restrictor OR’ Condition 
 
In the ‘Restrictor OR’ condition there were two test stories like this one: 
 
“This is a story about Mrs. Mouse’s toyshop. She has balls and books 
for sale in her shop. Here come two little boys and two little girls. The 
first little boy comes into the shop. “Hi Mrs. Mouse, I’m allowed to 
buy something in your shop today, what do you have for sale?” 
Hmmm, balls and books. The little boy decides on a ball. The next 
little girl also buys a ball. Then the last little girl and boy come into 
the shop. “Hi Mrs. Mouse. We saw our friends bought balls, but do 
you have anything else for sale?” Mrs. Mouse shows them the books. 
They are both considering books, but finally the little boy decides to 
take a ball. The last little girl really likes the books and she decides to 
buy one of those instead.”   
 

















Figure 2:  TRUE ‘Restrictor OR’ Condition 
 
Figure 2, which corresponds to the scene at the end of the story, illustrates this 
condition. After the story, the puppet watching alongside the child uttered test 
sentence (21) to describe what he thought happened in the story.  
 
(21) That was a story about Mrs. Mouse’s toyshop and the children who came 
to the shop. Every child bought something, and I know: Not every girl or 
boy bought a ball. 
 
In the ‘Restrictor OR’ test trials, a conjunctive interpretation does not arise, so 
sentence (21) does not mean that there must be both a girl and a boy who did not 
buy a ball; if only one girl or one boy did not buy a ball, this is sufficient to make 
the sentence true. In 2 of the 4 trials in this condition, the context was designed to 
make the test sentence true in this way — because only one character failed to 
complete an action. At the same time these contexts made the test sentence false 
if children incorrectly computed a conjunctive interpretation of disjunction in the 
restrictor of ‘not every’. In this case, sentence (21) would mean ‘there is some girl 
who did not buy a ball AND there is some boy who did not buy a ball’.4 In our 
toyshop story it was not true that ‘some boy did not buy a ball’, so the overall 
conjunctive statement ‘not every girl bought a ball AND not every boy bought a 
ball’ was false.  
 To make this potential reading as clear as possible, each story was designed 
so that one member of each group of participants (e.g., one girl and one boy) 
performed an action (e.g., buying a ball). Then towards the end of the story, the 
other member in each group hesitated to carry out the same action (e.g., both the 
second girl and boy consider buying books). At the early point in the story, then, 
a possible outcome was that ‘not every girl bought a ball AND not every boy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    4 Or more precisely that there must be both a girl, and a boy, and any individual who is both 
a girl and a boy, who did not buy a ball. As we have discussed the third possible truth 
condition cannot apply in these contexts, but the two remaining truth conditions are 
sufficient to test whether the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction is computed or not. 
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bought a ball’. Introducing a possible outcome in this way satisfies the condition 
of plausible dissent, making it felicitous for the child to reject the test sentence 
based on the actual outcome. The actual outcome made the test sentence false on 
a non-adult reading, because as the story unfolded, the second boy decided to 
buy a ball. The contrast between the possible outcome and the actual outcome 
makes it clear to the child why the sentence might be rejected. As with the 
‘Nuclear Scope OR’ condition, in this condition, too, the disjuncts were ordered 
such that the second disjunct made the sentence false on a non-adult reading. In 
this way, we ensured that children’s rejections could be attributed to the fact that 
they had erroneously computed a conjunctive interpretation of disjunction in the 
restrictor of ‘not every’, rather than because, say, children were simply not 
processing the full disjunctive statement. On the other hand, if children accessed 
the adult meaning of these sentences, they should have accepted them.  
 To control for the fact that children can also give a ‘yes’ response in 
situations where they are simply confused or fail to comprehend a sentence 
(Crain & Thornton 1998), the other two trials in this condition were designed to 
make the test sentence false. An example is given below. 
 
“Here are two caterpillars and two crocodiles who are going to try to 
make their way through a maze. Mickey Mouse is the judge. He is 
waiting at the end of the maze with some prizes. If an animal can make 
it to the end, they can choose a yo-yo or some flowers as their prize. Ok, 
here goes the first caterpillar. He manages to make it to the end and he 
chooses a yo-yo. Now the first crocodile is having a turn. He gets a bit 
stuck, but eventually makes it to the end. He decides to take a yo-yo 
too. Now the second caterpillar is having his turn. He makes it to the 
end too. He considers the flowers, which have nice juicy leaves he 
could eat, but in the end decides to take a yo-yo too. Finally, the last 
crocodile goes through the maze. He goes round and round but finally 













Figure 3:  FALSE ‘Restrictor OR’ Condition 
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Figure 3, which corresponds to the scene at the end of the story, illustrates this 
condition. After the story, the puppet watching alongside the child uttered test 
sentence (22) to describe what he thought happened in the story.  
 
(22) That was a story about some caterpillars and some crocodiles in a maze. 
Every animal reached the end of the maze and got a prize and I know: Not 
every caterpillar or crocodile choose a yo-yo. 
 
In the two trials of this type, the context made the test sentence false; that is, there 
was no character who failed to fulfill the action described (such as choosing a yo-
yo as a prize). Note that this context is necessarily false on both the adult reading 
of the sentence, and the possible non-adult reading (in which both a caterpillar 
and a crocodile must fail to choose a yo-yo). Therefore, these rejections alone do 
not allow us to draw any conclusions about children’s interpretation of disjunct-
ion in these sentences. However, taken in combination with their responses to the 
true ‘Restrictor OR’ trials, the overall pattern of responses in this condition will 
reveal whether children are accessing the adult reading. A majority of ‘no’ 
responses across all 4 trials will mean children are accessing a non-adult 
meaning; a majority of ‘yes’ responses across all 4 trials will mean children are 
confused by the test sentence; while a consistent pattern of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
responses will reveal adult-like knowledge of the meaning of the test sentences. 
 Let’s now consider what we predict for this condition. If children are 
guided by the logical principles we outlined, then they should demonstrate a 
different interpretation of disjunction in this context, as opposed to the ‘Nuclear 
Scope OR’ contexts. That is, children should be aware that, despite the fact that 
‘not every’ is downward entailing on its nuclear scope, it is not downward 
entailing on its restrictor. Therefore, children should accept our true ‘Restrictor 
OR’ trials and reject our false ‘Restrictor OR’ trials. If, on the other hand, children 
fail to recognize that negation reverses the entailment relations of the quantifier 
‘every’, they could erroneously compute a conjunctive interpretation of 
disjunction in the restrictor, and reject both types of ‘Restrictor OR’ trial. These 
predicted outcomes are summarized below.  
 
Prediction 2: If children are guided by logical principles, they should accept the 
adult-true ‘Restrictor-OR’ test sentences and reject the adult-false 
‘Restrictor-OR’ test sentences. Otherwise, they could reject both 
the adult-true and adult-false ‘Restrictor-OR’ test sentences. 
 
2.3. Control Condition 
 
In addition to the two test conditions, we included a control condition to check 
that children could respond to sentences containing the compound quantifier 
‘not every’, without the complicating factor of disjunction. These controls were 
administered following two stories identical in form to the ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ 
condition stories, but using different characters. After each control story, the 
puppet uttered two control sentences like (23). There were thus a total of 4 
control sentences. 
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(23) Not every pirate caught a horse. 
 
Note that, because ‘not every’ is a compound quantifier, it is not possible for the 
two composite parts of this determiner to enter into a scope relation with each 
other. This means that sentences like (23) are always assigned a reading in which 
some pirates did not catch horses (but typically some did). We will call this the 
‘not all’ reading. Although sentences like (23) are also theoretically true on the 
‘not all’ interpretation if no pirate catches a horse (i.e. it is certainly true that if 
none of the pirates caught a horse that not all of them did), this truth condition is 
generally ruled out for adults by the application of a scalar implicature. 
Accordingly, two of our control sentences described contexts in which, for 
example, two of four pirates had caught horses, but the other two had not. These 
controls were thus clearly true for adults and we will call them the adult-true 
controls. The other two controls described contexts in which, for example, all four 
pirates had caught horses. These controls were thus false for adults and we will 
call them the adult-false controls. 
 We included the controls to allow for the possibility that children do not 
interpret ‘not every’ as a compound quantifier, but rather as two separate logical 
operators that can take scope over each other. In this case, one possible scope 
assignment would be to assign ‘not’ wide scope over ‘every’. This results in the 
‘not all’ reading, identical to the adult interpretation of the compound quantifier. 
The other possible scope assignment would be to assign ‘every’ wide scope over 
‘not’. This results in a ‘none’ reading, and sentence (23) would mean that no 
pirate caught a horse. This ‘none’ reading is a narrower, stronger meaning of the 
sentence than the ‘not all’ reading (which, as we pointed out above, is true if just 
some pirates do not catch horses, or if none of them do). As such, according to 
the SSM, if children do interpret the compound quantifier ‘not every’ as two 
separate scope-bearing elements, then they should tend to access a ‘none’ reading 
of our control sentences. In this case we would expect to see children reject the 
adult-true controls, as well as the adult-false controls. Alternatively, if they 
successfully analyze ‘not every’ as a compound quantifier then we expect to see 
children accept the adult-true controls, and reject the adult-false controls. A third 
possible state of affairs is that children do not successfully analyze ‘not every’ as 
a compound quantifier, but they also do not preferentially assign ‘every’ wide 
scope over ‘not’, contra the predictions of the SSM. The overall percentage of 
children’s responses to the adult-true control condition should allow us to 
distinguish between these scenarios. Here is the relevant prediction: 
 
Prediction 3: If children erroneously apply scope to ‘every’ and ‘not’ as separate 
operators, and the SSM holds, then they should prefer a ‘none’ 
reading of the adult-true control sentences, and reject the adult-
true control sentences more than 50% of the time (or at least 
around 50% of the time if the SSM does not hold, and they 
therefore have no preference between the ‘not all’ and ‘none’ 
readings of the sentences).  
 
If children do not apply scope to ‘every’ and ‘not’ as separate 
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operators, then they should access the ‘not all’ reading of the 
adult-true control sentences, and accept the adult-true control 
sentences more than 50% of the time. 
 
It was important to control for the children’s analysis of ‘not every’ without 
disjunction, because any child who failed the adult-true controls (showing that 
they perhaps allowed ‘every’ to take scope over ‘not’) might also allow ‘every’ to 
take scope over ‘not’ in our test condition sentences. In this case, they might 
interpret a sentence in the ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ condition like ‘not every princess 
took a shell or a star’ to mean that no princess took either of the objects in 
question, or that no princess took one of the objects in question. On either of 
these possible interpretations, our test sentences in the ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ 
condition would be false (because at least some of the princesses took shells, and 
all of them took stars). We would thus not be able to tell whether a child’s 
rejections in this condition were due to their being guided by logical principles 
and the SSM (Prediction 1) or due to an erroneous analysis of the compound 
quantifier ‘not every’.  
 Similarly, a child who failed the adult-true controls might interpret a 
sentence in the ‘Restrictor OR’ condition like ‘not every boy or girl bought a ball’ 
to mean that no boy and no girl bought a ball, or that either no boy or no girl 
bought a ball. On either of these possible interpretations, our test sentences in the 
‘Restrictor OR’ condition would also be false (because three children did buy 
balls, including both boys and girls). We would thus not be able to tell whether 
the child’s rejections in this condition were due to a failure to recognize that 
negation reverses the entailment relations of ‘every’ (Prediction 2) or again, due 
to an erroneous analysis of the compound quantifier ‘not every’. On the other 
hand, for children who pass the controls, we can be confident that our 




We tested 22 English–speaking children (14 male, 8 female) between the ages of 
4;2 and 5;2 (mean age 4;8). The child subjects were recruited from two child-care 
centers at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. In addition, 19 English–
speaking adults were tested as controls (4 male, 15 female) between the ages of 19 




The 8 test and 4 control items (12 items in total) were administered in a pseudo-
random order, interspersed with filler items (10 items in total). On these filler 
items, the puppet produced statements like (24) and (25), which were either 
obviously true or obviously false. As with the target sentences, the filler items 
were preceded by a lead-in sentence that made them felicitous in the context. 
 
(24) What the first princess did was choose a purple shell and a silver star. 
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(25) Choose a red yo-yo is what the last crocodile did. 
 
These filler items were included to balance the overall number of true and false 
sentences, to check that the child could answer both ‘yes’ and ‘no’ correctly, and 
to obscure the purpose of the experiment. 
 The children were tested individually in a quiet corner of their day-care 
centre. Each child was introduced to our puppet, Cookie Monster, and given two 
practice items before the actual test, one in which Cookie Monster made an 
obviously true statement about a story, and one in which he made an obviously 
false statement about a story. This was so that children would know that the 
puppet could say something wrong. These practice items were also used to 
familiarize children with the task. The full test was only administered to those 
children who correctly responded to the puppet’s statements in the practice items. 
Because the stories were quite involved and the test sentences relatively difficult, 
the test, control and filler items were divided in half and presented over two 
sessions to reduce fatigue. Each session included 4 test items, 2 control items and 
5 fillers. The full list and ordering of test materials for the two sessions is given in 
Appendix A.  
 To test the 19 adult subjects, the stories were video recorded. The adults 
were then tested in small groups of 3-5 participants. They watched the stories 
and recorded whether they thought each test sentence was a true or false 
description of the story on an answer sheet. They were always asked to justify 
their answer, whether they judged the test sentence to be true or false, so the 
answer sheet introduced no bias in how they should respond to any particular 
test sentence. Also, in that way they would not be aware if they were responding 
similarly or differently to other participants in their group, as all participants 





Five children were excluded from the data analysis either because they answered 
incorrectly on more than one filler item (2 children), or because they answered 
incorrectly on more than one control item (3 children). In total, the results of 17 
children (11 boys, 6 girls), aged 4;2-5;2 (mean age 4;8) are presented below. We 
coded each subject’s initial response to the test sentences. Self-corrections were 
accepted only if the test sentence had not been repeated. Both the child’s true or 
false judgment of each sentence, as well as their justification for their answers, 
were taken into consideration in coding the data. Only answers in which the 
justification matched the judgment were considered in the final analysis.  
 On some occasions both children and adults gave responses in which their 
justification did not appropriately account for their judgment. For example, 
sometimes they gave mismatched responses, in which they provided a 
justification typical of a false judgment, but they accepted the test sentence, or 
vice versa. On other occasions some children gave justifications referring to extra 
objects in the context. All the test and control stories always had plenty of extra 
objects in the context that did not get acted on at all. For example, in the princess 
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story, at the end of the story, there were several leftover shells and stars in the 
castle. This was done because much work on children’s and adult’s interpretation 
of the universal quantifier has shown that a single leftover object in the context 
can affect pragmatic felicity. Although adults can generally cope with this 
infelicity, it can mislead children, who then judge stories on the fact that an object 
was left-over, rather than on the truth content of the test sentences (Crain et al. 
1996, Freeman et al. 1982, Meroni et al. 2001). Although we tried to satisfy 
pragmatic felicity by including plenty of extra objects (rather than just one), 
occasionally children still gave an answer based on extra objects in the context. In 
short, any answers like these, in which a justification did not appropriately 
account for a judgment, were coded as ‘Other’, and were not included in the final 
counts of rejections and acceptances. 
 
3.1. Control Results 
 
Each child was given 2 adult-false controls and 2 adult-true controls. The 17 
children included in further analysis successfully accepted the adult-true control 
sentences 91% of the time (31/34 trials). The 3 rejections in this condition came 
from 3 separate children, rather than from one child consistently. The children 
also rejected the adult-false controls 88% of the time (30/34 trials). These 
rejections were accompanied by justifications explaining that in fact, all the 
characters in question had performed some action. For example, in response to 
the adult-false control ‘not every pirate caught a dinosaur’, a child aged 4;5 said ‘no, 
because all of the pirates caught dinosaurs’. There were 2 acceptances of an adult-
false control (from 2 separate children). The remaining 2 responses (also from 2 
separate children) were coded as ‘Other’ because the children justified their 
answers by referring to objects left over in the testing context, rather than to the 
characters in question. A Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test showed the difference 
between the children’s acceptance rates in the two control conditions to be 
significant (Z = 3.79, p < 0.001). According to Prediction 3, because the acceptance 
rate for the adult-true trials is well above 50% for children, we can be confident 
that those children who were included in the subsequent data analysis treated 
‘not every’ as a compound quantifier, assigning it a ‘not all’ meaning.5  
 The 19 adults tested successfully accepted all their adult-true control trials 
100% of the time (38/38 trials). They rejected their adult-false control trials 92% of 
the time (35/38 trials). Two adults did accept one of these trials each. These 
acceptances were both in response to the sentence ‘Not every pirate caught a 
dinosaur’ in a context in which two pirates caught dinosaurs, and two pirates 
caught dinosaurs and horses. The adults accepted the test sentence, explaining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    5 It is also possible that children accepted the adult-true control sentences because, despite 
treating ‘not’ and ‘every’ as two separate scope-bearing elements, children preferred to 
interpret ‘not’ as taking scope over ‘every’, given that the ‘not all’ meaning of ‘not every’ 
would be the only meaning modeled for them in the input. In the introduction, however, we 
reported that we found no instances of ‘not every’ in a large survey of input. Moreover, we 
also reported that several cross-linguistic studies have shown that children do not 
necessarily prefer the scope relationships modeled for them in the input. For these reasons, 
we think this is a less likely explanation of our data than the one we have offered here, that 
children successfully analyzed ‘not every’ as a compound quantifier. 
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that, indeed, only two pirates had caught ONLY dinosaurs. One adult failed to 
respond on one trial. The child and adult responses to the two types of control 
sentences are summarized in Table 1. A Mann-Whitney test showed no signify-
cant difference between children’s and adult’s acceptance rates to the controls 
either to adult-false trials (Z = 0.11, p = 0.950) or adult-true trials (Z = 1.87, p = 
0.379). 
 










 Acceptance 6% 
(2/34 trials) 
5%  
(2/38 trials)  



















Table 1:  Child and Adult Control Results 
 
3.2. ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ Condition Results 
 
Each child was given 4 trials in the ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ condition giving a total of 
68 trials for analysis. The total rejection rate was 82% (56/68 trials). These 56 
rejections comprised 2 different kinds of responses. In 46 of the 56 rejections the 
children provided an adult-like justification for their answer (typically referring 
to the fact that all four characters in the story had performed some action). These 
answers were coded as ‘False – Correct Justification’. An example of this type of 
response from a child aged 4;5 is given in (26). 
 
(26) Puppet: Not every princess took a shell or a star. 
 Child: every princess, not every princess took a shell, that was correct, 
but every, but every…every of these people have a star. 
 
On the other 10 trials (from 6 different children), the children judged the test 
sentences to be false, but their justifications referred to the fact that two 
characters in the story had not performed some action (rather than to the fact that 
all four had performed some action). We included these in the overall count of 
false judgements, and coded them as ‘False – Inverted Justification’. This 
probably occurred because of the difficulty involved in justifying a negative 
judgment about a negative sentence. In fact, the correct justification involves 
explaining that the FAILURE to perform some action (by some characters) is 
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correct, and that the SUCCESS in performing some other action (by all characters) 
is incorrect. So, although the children who gave ‘False – Inverted Justification’ 
responses did judge the sentences to be incorrect descriptions of the story they 
had just heard, they then had trouble explaining which part of the context had 
not been correctly described. They offered the failure to perform some action as a 
more pragmatically felicitous justification of what made the test sentence 
incorrect than the success in performing some other action. An example of this 
type of response from a child aged 4;8 is given in (27). 
 
(27) Puppet: Not every princess took a shell or a star. 
 Child: every princess got a star, but not, not all of them got these [shells]. 
 Puppet: so was I right or wrong? 
 Child: um right for the stars and wrong for the shells. 
 
Children accepted trials in this condition 10% of the time (7/68 trials), and these 
acceptances came from 7 different children, rather than from one child 
consistently. The remaining responses were coded as ‘Other’ because either the 
child gave no answer (1 trial), an answer related to objects left-over in the testing 
context, or some other justification not clearly related to the test sentence (2 trials), 
or a mismatched answer in which they provided a correct justification for a 
rejection, but then accepted the test sentence (2 trials). These other responses 
accounted for 7% of the data (5/68 trials). 
 The 19 adults tested also responded to 4 trials each, giving a total of 76 
trials for analysis. The total rejection rate was 68% (52/76 trials). In 51 of the 52 
rejections, adults offered a justification for their answer referring to the fact that 
all four characters in the story had performed an action. However, on one trial, 
one adult did give an ‘Inverted Justification’. This shows that, even for adults, 
justifying a negative judgment about a negative sentence can be difficult 
pragmatically. The adults accepted their ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ trials 25% of the 
time (19/76 trials). In justification of these acceptances, the adults offered the 
kind of explanations that we had allowed for in the context if disjunction were 
allowed to scope over ‘not every’, making a statement like ‘Not every princess 
took a shell or a star’ possibly true if, for example, not every princess took a shell. 
An example of this kind of response is given in (28). 
 
(28) Test sentence: Not every frog jumped over the fence or the pond. 
 Response:  True, not every frog jumped over the fence. 
 
The remaining adult responses were coded as ‘Other’ because either they gave no 
answer (1 trial), an answer related to objects left-over in the testing context (2 
trials), or a mismatched answer in which they provided a correct justification for 
a rejection, but judged the test sentence to be true (2 trials). These other responses 
accounted for 7% of the data (5/76 trials).  
 The child and adult responses in this condition are summarized in Table 2. 
A Mann-Whitney test showed no significant difference between children’s and 
adult’s rejection rates in this condition (Z = 1.34, p = 0.232). 
 







False – Correct Justification 67.7% 
(46/68 trials)  
67.1%  
(51/76 trials)  
















Table 2:  Child and Adult ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ Condition Results 
 
3.3. ‘Restrictor OR’ Condition Results 
 
Each child was given 2 true trials and 2 false trials in the ‘Restrictor OR’ condition, 
giving a total of 34 true trials and 34 false trials for analysis. The children 
accepted their true ‘Restrictor OR’ trials 65% of the time (22/34 trials). There 
were 5 rejections of true trials (from 5 separate children). In these cases the 
children gave justifications for their answers referring to the fact that all the 
members of one of the sets of actors had, in fact, performed the action in question. 
To illustrate, an example from a child aged 4;6 is given in (29), although no child 
consistently responded to these trials in this way.  
 
(29) Puppet: Not every fish or dolphin swam through a square. 
 Child: every fish went to the square and one dolphin went to the square. 
 Puppet: oh it was a hard one for me, not every fish or dolphin swam 
through a square, right or wrong? 
 Child:  wrong. 
 
Rejections like these accounted for 15% of the data (5/34 trials). The remaining 7 
trials were coded as ‘Other’ because either the child gave no answer (1 trial), an 
answer related to objects left-over in the testing context (2 trials), or a 
mismatched answer in which a correct justification was provided for an 
acceptance (by talking about the one character who had, indeed, not performed 
the action in question), but the children then rejected the test sentence (4 trials). 
These other responses accounted for 20% of the data (7/34 trials).  
 The children rejected their false ‘Restrictor OR’ trials 94% of the time (32/34 
trials). One child accepted one false trial, and one trial was coded as ‘Other’ 
because a child provided a mismatched answer in which he provided a correct 
justification for a rejection, but accepted the test sentence. A Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks test showed the difference between the children’s acceptance rates to the 
true and false test sentences in the ‘Restrictor OR’ condition to be significant (Z = 
3.52, p < 0.001). The strong rejection rate in response to the false ‘Restrictor OR’ 
trials means we can be confident that the children’s acceptances of the true trials 
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are genuine acceptances, rather than the result of confusion.  
 The 19 adults tested also responded to 2 true and 2 false trials each, giving 
a total of 38 true and 38 false trials for analysis. The adults accepted their true 
trials 92% of the time (35/38 trials). The remaining 3 trials were coded as ‘Other’. 
These trials all related to our story about fish and dolphins swimming through 
shapes. Because the positive lead-in to this story’s test sentence was ‘Every 
animal swam through a shape’, 3 adults judged this to be false because a stingray 
in the story, who was introduced as the teacher at fish school, did not swim 
through any shape. The adults rejected their false ‘Restrictor OR’ trials 100% of 
the time (38/38 trials). 
 The child and adult responses in this condition are summarized in Table 3. 
A 2 (Age: child, adult) x 2 (Condition: true, false) ANOVA was carried out on the 
results with acceptance rate as the dependent measure. There was a main effect 
of condition, F (3,71) = 575.61, p < 0.000, but no main effect of age. Both children 
and adults tended to accept the true ‘Restrictor OR’ trials and reject the false ones. 
However, there was also an interaction effect of condition and age, F (3,71) = 7.58, 
p < 0.01. So, children tended to accept their true trials less often than adults, 
while accepting their false trials more often than adults. This is not surprising, 
however, given that adults performed more at less at ceiling in this condition. 
Post-hoc Mann-Whitney pair-wise comparisons revealed that there was actually 
no significant difference between children’s and adult’s acceptance rates in this 
condition in response to false trials (Z = 1.06, p = 0.778). However, there was a 
significant difference between the two groups’ acceptance rates in response to 
true trials (Z = 2.99, p < 0.05).  
 














































This study investigated 4- to 5-year-old English-speaking children’s inter-
pretation of disjunction in both the nuclear scope and in the restrictor of the 
compound quantifier ‘not every’. The aim of this investigation was two-fold. The 
first aim was to assess the extent to which children are guided by logical prin-
ciples in their interpretation of sentences containing multiple logical operators. 
Given that these sentences are not readily available in the primary linguistic data, 
children’s responses to such sentences could be revealing about their knowledge 
of logic. We suggested that in order to compute a conjunctive interpretation of 
disjunction in the nuclear scope but not in the restrictor of ‘not every’, children 
must make use of several logical facts: (i) that the meaning of OR in natural 
language is inclusive-or, (ii) that ‘not every’ is logically equivalent to ‘some not’, 
and (iii) that disjunction gives rise to a conjunctive interpretation in the scope of a 
DE operator, through the application of de Morgan’s law stating that ‘not (P or 
Q)’ is logically equivalent to ‘not P and not Q’. As noted in the introduction, 
children are unlikely to be exposed to sufficient input demonstrating how the 
logical expressions ‘not’, ‘every’, and ‘or’ are interpreted in combination. Given 
that the requisite input is rare, we reasoned that if children are able to compute 
the meanings of these sentences, then it is likely that they are engaging innate 
knowledge of the combinatory principles of logic. So, one aim of the present 
study was to provide evidence bearing on the ‘nature versus nurture’ debate on 
the acquisition of logical principles.  
 The second aim was to test the predictions of the Semantic Subset Maxim. 
The Semantic Subset Maxim states the following: presented with a sentence in 
which two or more scope interpretations are available, if these two 
interpretations form a subset-superset relationship, children should initially 
favor the subset reading, namely the reading that makes the sentence true in the 
narrowest range of circumstances. Adopting this maxim ensures that children 
will quickly acquire the same scope preferences as adult speakers of the local 
language. When disjunction occurs in the nuclear scope of ‘not every’, a scope 
ambiguity of this type arises. If ‘not every’ is assigned wide scope over 
disjunction, then a conjunctive interpretation of disjunction is computed. If, on 
the other hand, disjunction is assigned wide scope over ‘not every’, then ‘or’ is 
interpreted outside of a downward entailing environment, and no conjunctive 
interpretation arises. The conjunctive reading is a narrower, stronger reading of 
the sentence than the disjunctive reading, so the SSM predicts that children 
should prefer the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction.  
 In our first test condition, the ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ condition, children were 
asked to respond to sentences like ‘Not every princess took a shell or a star’. 
These sentences were designed to be false on a conjunctive interpretation of 
disjunction, but true on a disjunctive interpretation. We found that children 
rejected the test sentences in this condition 82% of the time. This shows that they 
assigned a conjunctive interpretation to disjunction, as predicted. This result 
supports our experimental hypothesis that children are guided by innate logical 
principles in their interpretation of complex logical sentences containing logical 
operators. In fact, we found that children preferred the conjunctive interpretation 
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of the test sentences more than adults did. Adults only rejected our ‘Nuclear 
Scope OR’ test sentences 68% of the time, and they accepted them 25% of the time. 
The acceptances were spread across 11 of the 19 adults. Although the difference 
between adult and child preferences in this condition was not statistically 
significant, it was a trend in the direction predicted by the SSM. Perhaps with a 
larger sample size, a significant difference would be revealed. In all, the results of 
the ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ condition strongly support Prediction 1, providing 
evidence that both the SSM and the relevant logical principles (outlined above) 
do, indeed, appear to be in operation in the language apparatus of children.  
 Our second test condition was the ‘Restrictor OR’ condition. In this 
condition, children responded to sentences like ‘Not every girl or boy bought a 
ball’. Half of these sentences were true if disjunction was given a disjunctive 
interpretation, but false if a conjunctive interpretation was assigned. Children 
accepted the test sentences 65% of the time in this condition. Although above 
chance, children’s acceptance rate was significantly different from that of adults 
(92% acceptance). These results, therefore, do not unequivocally support the 
second experimental hypothesis, Prediction 2. If children draw upon the ‘not 
every = some not’ logical equivalence in interpreting our test sentences, then they 
should have shown a more robust pattern of acceptances in this condition, as 
compared to their pattern of rejections in the ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ condition.  
 Nonetheless, this result does not necessarily mean that children were 
unaware that negation reverses the entailment relations of ‘every’, and that they 
thereby erroneously assigned a conjunctive interpretation to disjunction in the 
restrictor of ‘not every’, as would have been the case if children rejected the 
remaining trials. Children only rejected the true ‘Restrictor OR’ trials on 5 out of 
34 trials (15% of the time). The rest of children’s responses were classified as 
‘Other,’ because children failed to clearly justify the reasons for making their 
judgements. This finding is indicative of a general difficulty children experienced 
in accepting these kinds of test sentences in the contexts provided, rather than a 
problem in distinguishing the arguments of ‘not every’.  
 There are several possible reasons for this. One contributing factor might be 
the complex character of the downward entailing context. If we take the defining 
property of a DE environment to be the licensing of an inference from sets to 
subsets, then the nuclear scope of ‘not every’ clearly is downward entailing, 
while the restrictor is not. It is possible to make an inference from a general term 
to a more specific term in the nuclear scope of ‘not every’ (e.g., if it is true that 
‘not every living thing is an animal’ then it is certainly true that ‘not every living 
thing is a bird’), while it is not in the restrictor (e.g., if is true that ‘not every 
animal has four legs’, then it is not necessarily true that ‘not every fox has four 
legs’). In this study we concentrated on one of the diagnostic properties of DE 
contexts, the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction, which arises in the nuclear 
scope of ‘not every’ and not in the restrictor. However, as we discussed in the 
introduction, another diagnostic property is the licensing of NPI items like ‘any’. 
In fact, it turns out that ‘any’ is NOT licensed in the nuclear scope of ‘not every’, 
while it is licensed in the restrictor. Compare (30a) and (b). 
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(30) a.      *Not every girl or boy bought any ball.  
 b. Not every girl or boy who had any money bought a ball. 
 
The ungrammaticality of (30a), as opposed to (30b), shows that being in the scope 
of a DE operator is not necessarily a sufficient condition to license an NPI like 
‘any’. When certain logical operators intervene between a DE operator and an 
NPI, the patterns of licensing can be disrupted. In (30), it seems that the 
intervention of the universal quantifier ‘every’ between ‘not’ and ‘any’ blocks the 
negation operator from licensing ‘any’ in the predicate phrase. On the other hand, 
‘any’ is grammatical in the subject phrase, because it is in the scope of the DE 
operator ‘every’ in that structural position.  
 Intervention effects in NPI licensing have been the subject of much 
investigation (see for example: Chierchia 2004, Chierchia et al. 2011, Guerzoni 
2006, Linebarger 1987), however a discussion of these effects would take us 
beyond the concerns of the present paper. All we wish to point out is that, due to 
these effects, the DE properties of the complex quantifier ‘not every’ present a 
mixed picture to children. On the one hand, the conjunctive interpretation arises 
in the nuclear scope, but not in the restrictor. On the other hand, an NPI item like 
‘any’ is not licensed in the nuclear scope, but is licensed in the restrictor. Perhaps 
this conflicting combination of diagnostic properties contributed to children’s 
difficulty with our ‘Restrictor OR’ trials. Nonetheless, if this were the reason for 
children’s difficulty, it is strange that it did not appear to affect children’s ability 
to respond to the ‘Nuclear Scope OR’ trials. Our guess is, rather, that children’s 
difficulty stemmed from a pragmatic infelicity in the construction of our trials. 
This would mean that in a more felicitous context, it should be possible to show 
that children accept true ‘Restrictor OR’ trials to a higher degree. This in turn 
would show that the logical principles under investigation are, indeed, applied 
by children in all the required semantic environments.  
 One source of possible infelicity in our ‘Restrictor OR’ trials is the fact that 
we used a negative statement, rather than a positive one, to describe the situation 
at the end of each story. It has been shown that two approaches can help in 
mitigating this infelicity. One approach recommends the use of a positive lead-in 
statement (Musolino & Lidz 2006), which is the tactic we employed. Another 
approach recommends introducing an explicit discrepancy between the expected 
and actual outcome of each story (Gualmini 2005). We wondered whether 
combining these two approaches might be required to help children accept 
complex negative statements like those tested in the ‘Restrictor OR’ condition. 
We adapted our true ‘Restrictor OR’ stories to set up a clear discrepancy between 
the expected and actual outcome. For example, in our toyshop story, we 
mentioned that the balls for sale in the shop cost three coins, and the books only 
cost two coins. Every child who visited the shop wanted to buy a ball, but only 
two boys and one girl had enough money to do so. The last little girl only had 
two coins, because she had spent one on the way to the shop, and so she had to 
buy a book. This set-up emphasized that all the children were expected to buy 
balls, but in actual fact, one could not. The puppet then uttered the test sentence 
with a positive lead-in as in the original study (e.g., ‘every child bought 
something, and I know: Not every girl or boy bought a ball’). We piloted these 
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new stories with 5 children (aged 3;9–5;1). The children heard two stories each. 
However, we found almost identical results to the ones reported here. The 
children accepted the stories 66% of the time, and rejected them 33% of the time. 
We take from this that our original positive lead-ins were already sufficient to 
counter any infelicity associated with the use of a negative statement to describe 
the situations under consideration. Indeed, this makes sense given that the 
children were perfectly able to accept our true control statements (e.g., not every 
pirate caught a horse) with a positive lead-in alone. 
 Another more promising possibility is that our stories did not satisfy one of 
the presuppositions that is associated with the use of a universally quantified 
phrase that contains disjunction in the restrictor. Consider a phrase like ‘every 
passenger who ordered chicken or beef’. It is only useful to divide the superset of 
passengers into two subsets if we are then contrasting these two subsets with one 
or more other subsets. For example, we might want to say ‘every passenger who 
ordered chicken or beef became ill, but passengers who ordered fish did not’. If 
there are only passengers who ordered chicken or beef in the context, and they all 
fell ill, then it is pragmatically odd to state this. One might as well say ‘Every 
passenger became ill’. Using disjunction in the restrictor of a universally 
quantified phrase therefore presupposes that there is at least one other subset in 
the context that doesn’t share the property attributed to the two subsets being 
quantified over. To satisfy this presupposition, we would need to include a 
contrast set of characters in our stories, in addition to the two sets of characters 
being universally quantified over. We leave this modification for a future study. 
 Despite inconclusive results in our ‘Restrictor OR’ condition, our ‘Nuclear 
Scope OR’ condition has allowed us to further test both the predictions of the 
Semantic Subset Maxim, and the hypothesis that children possess a body of 
logical knowledge that initially guides them in their interpretation of sentences 
containing logical operators. We have shown that English-speaking children 
access the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction in the nuclear scope of ‘not 
every’, a compound quantifier that had not yet been investigated in the literature. 
In fact, they access this interpretation more often than adults, which is in line 
with the predictions of the Semantic Subset Maxim. We have further suggested 
that children are capable of correctly interpreting these complex sentences 
because they are guided by a set of logical principles which together result in OR 
being assigned a conjunctive interpretation whenever it occurs in a downward 
entailing environment in natural language.  
 
 
Appendix:  Test Materials 
 
A.1. Testing Session 1 
 
Warm-Up: I know what happened to Piglet. Piglet ate the (thing he ate) [T] 
Warm-Up: Let me see, Eeyore ate the (1st thing he ate) [T], and he didn’t eat the 
(2nd thing he ate) [F].  
Control: That was a story about 4 pirates trying to catch animals and I know 
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— Not every pirate caught a dinosaur [F] 
Control: Let me try something else. Not every pirate caught a horse [T] 
Filler: I know what the first pirate did. Catch a horse and an orange 
dinosaur is what the first pirate did [F] 
Test 1: That was a story about 4 farmers washing animals. Every farmer 
washed some animals and I know — Not every farmer washed a cow 
or a dog [F] 
Filler: I know what the pigs did. What the pigs did is get out of their pond 
[F] 
Test 2: That was a story about 4 babies and their parents, the mums and 
dads. Every parent came to check on the babies and I know — Not 
every mum or dad put a baby to bed [F] 
Filler: I know what the last dad did. Choose a yellow blanket is what the 
last dad did [T] 
Test 3: That was a story about 4 frogs playing a jumping game. Every frog 
jumped over something and I know — Not every frog jumped over 
the fence or the pond [F] 
Filler: I know what Mrs. Kangaroo did. What Mrs. Kangaroo did is jump 
over all the frogs [F] 
Test 4: That was a story about some fish and some dolphins at school 
learning about shapes. Every animal swam through a shape, and I 
know — Not every fish or dolphin swam through a square [T] 
Filler: The first little fish swam through a blue square [T] 
 
A.2. Testing Session 2 
 
Control: That was a story about 4 aliens trying new things to eat. Every alien 
had something to eat, and I know — Not every alien tried a 
strawberry [F] 
Control: Let me try something else. Not every alien tried a feather [T] 
Filler: Some of the aliens tried the red feathers, and none of the aliens tried 
the purple feather [T] 
Test 5: That was a story about Mrs. Mouse’s toyshop and the girls and boys 
who came to the shop. Every child bought something and I know — 
Not every girl or boy bought a ball [T] 
Filler: I know what the last little girl did. Buy a blue book is what the last 
little girl did [T] 
Test 6: That was a story about 4 princesses looking for treasure. Every 
princess took some treasure and I know — Not every princess took a 
shell or a star [F] 
Filler: I know what the first princess did. What the first princess did is take 
a star and a purple shell [T] 
Test 7: That was a story about some caterpillars and some crocodiles in a 
maze. Every animal reached the end of the maze and got a prize, and 
I know – Not every caterpillar or crocodile chose a yo-yo [F] 
Filler: I know what the last crocodile did. Choose a red yo-yo is what the 
last crocodile did [F]  
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Test 8: That was a story about 4 trolls who liked to tickle animals. Every troll 
tickled somebody and I know — Not every troll tickled a turtle or a 
teddy [F] 
Filler: I know what the bunnies did. What the bunnies did is hop so fast the 
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